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NOTES AND COMMENTS
CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS ON THE LEGISLATIVE
POWER OF INVESTIGATIONS
Two recent decisions of great importance, Watkins v. United States,1 and
Sweezy v. New Hampshire,2 are judicial attempts at answering the question:
What are the rights and privileges of a witness before a legislative investigating
committee? Involved in this question are difficult problems of determining the
proper limits of the power of inquiry, of establishing the minimum requirements
that must be met by investigative bodies in order to satisfy demands of fair play
and adequate notice. Solutions to these problems must be met within an area
of conflicting interests: on the one hand the desire to expand and preserve
individual action and expression, while at the same time a need for the free
flow of all important information to our legislatures, to allow them to function
properly and to keep informed. The decisions recognize the problems, and
attempt to reconcile the conflict by finding a middle ground where questions of
interpretation and definition can be viewed and discussed, and extreme approaches
avoided. An adequate recognition of the problems involved does not always
produce the most desirable result. 'Whether the Supreme Court in the Watkins
decision has been able to speak clearly at a time when dear speech is a necessity
will be the subject matter of this discussion.
THE HISTORY OF LEGISLATIVE INQUIRY

For almost one hundred years following the adoption of the Constitution,
the institution of legislative inquiry "flourished virtually free from judicial
supervision or control. '3 Legislative inquiry as an institution has roots as old
and deep as most legislative institutions, and its growth and development within
the United States traced to its source, the English Parliament. 4 In Anderson v.
Dunn,5 an early decision in this country, legislative inquiry was recognized as an
institution not readily susceptible to judicial review or control. The decision also
left its impression in the growth of the contempt power, by a recognition of an
inherent power of Congress to punish for contempt.
1. 77 Sup. Ct. 1173 (1957).
2. 77 Sup. Ct. 1203 (1957).
3. Fields v. United States, 164 F.2d 97, 99 (App. D.C. 1947). For the most
complete scholarly discussion of the early historical background of legislative
inquiries, see Landis, Constitutional Limitations on the Congressional Power of
Investigation, 40 HARv. L. R.V. 153 (1926). Also, Potts, Power of Legislative
Bodies to Punish for Contempt, 74 U. oF PA. L. REV.691 (1926).
4. Morgan, Kilbourn v. Thompson Revisited, 37 CAL. L. REV. 556 (1948).
5. 6 Wheat. 204 (U. S. 1821). The power of state legislatures to investigate
and to punish contempts was upheld at an early date in Briggs v. MacKellar,
2 Abb. Pr. 30 (N.Y. 1855).
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The Constitution,6 confers upon each House of Congress power to punish
contempt committed by its own members. It does not mention any power to
punish non-members for contempt. Nevertheless, action was taken against nonmembers, thus indicating that Congress found a power to punish by implication.
The Anderson decision, involving a trespass, and Ex Parte Nugent 7 an assault,
were early statements by the Supreme Court that Congress did possess, not only
the power to punish for contempt, but also the ability to serve as a fact-finding
body. The early traditional power of contempt was exercised by bringing the
witness or offender to the bar of the House and there trying him. If he was
found guilty, the offended House ordered the Sergeant-at-Arms to imprison the
offender for the duration of the session. It can be seen that the severity of the
sanctions exercised was limited in time, and in space, since the witness could not
be held in contempt longer than the session which was in progress at the time
his contempt occurred. Thus, this traditional method had its limitations, and a
better method had to be devised by which Congress would initiate the contempt
proceedings, and leave the imposition of a fine or imprisonment to an executive
official, acting under judicial supervision.
In 1857, the procedure for handling certain of these charges was altered,
when Congress provided by statute8 that on the refusal of a witness to testify,
his rebsal was to be interpreted as an offense against the House or Senate, which
would certify the fact of contempt to the District Attorney for the District of
Columbia, who would then prosecute the witness for a misdemeanor. The enactment of 1857 was upheld, 9 in an inquiry which investigated charges of corruption
among certain senators, and more recent proceedings under the present statutory
provisions have been the rule,10 and punishment before the bar the exception.
With the early development of the power to punish contempt, came the growth
of the power to investigate. Early decisions had dealt with a study of the historical
sources of the investigative power, but none attempted to place any limits upon
this power, nor to determine whether this power might not in some way conflict
with any constitutional doctrine.
It was not until 1881, in Kilbourn v. Thompson," that the Supreme Court
undertook to pass upon the validity of a judgment of the House of Representatives, adjudicating a witness to be in contempt of the authority of the House. The
decision involved a legislative inquiry into the operations of a so-called real
estate pool, and the amount of indebtedness arising from the failure of Jay
Cook & Co., a well-known banking house. One Kilbourn refused to answer
6.

U.S. CONST., art. I, §5.

7. 18 Fed. Cas. 483, No. 10377 (1838).
8. REv. STAT. §102 (1875), as amended, 2 U.S.C. §192 (1952).

9. In re Chapman, 166 U.S. 661 (1895).
10. See note 8, supra.
11.

103 U.S. 168 (1881).
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questions propounded by the committee and was ordered arrested by the House
to answer for contempt. Kilbourn raised the issufe of the House's power to
investigate under broad resolutions, and to punish for contempt. The decision
of the Supreme Court imposed a constitutional limitation which involved the
separation of powers, suggesting that such powers of investigation were to be
regulated by the judiciary, while at the same time admitting a special power to
punish for contempt. The Court assumed the authority to examine the legal
basis of the committee's powers and its proceeding, and looked to a connection
between the information sought, and one of the powers expressly conferred upon
Congress, or for purposes of legislation. If the information sought was within
one of the powers expressly conferred upon Congress, the authorizing resolution
would not be challenged, and a proper legislative purpose found to exist.
The decision was thought to have set back legislative investigations, and its
actual and limited effect was not known until the oil scandal investigations in the
nineteen twenties. It was in the famous cases of McGrain v. Daugherty,'2 and
Sinclair v. United States,'3 that the Supreme Court qualified earlier intimations
that the powers to investigate and initiate contempt proceedings were to be
carefully scrutinized.. The corruption in the handling of the oil leases had aroused
public agitation, and as a result congressional investigations were begun. The skill.
and success of these committees in scourging official corruption, coupled with
strong scholarly comment in support of full legislative investigative powers,
brought a change in view by the Supreme Court. This change was limited to
investigations which revealed misconduct in high public offices, and was not
meant to be expanded to such investigations which were concerned with testimony
of individuals given in times of national and international tension. But, the
public revealed a climate of opinion more receptive to a more wide-open use
of committee investigations, and the view which supported the most liberal
use of the powers of search and subpoena dominated the thinking of both the
Congress and the courts.1 4 None of the decisions rendered by any court came to
grips with the problems of the reach of the committee power of investigations,
what due process requirements had to be met by these committees, and just what
conduct an individual had to avoid in order to escape punishment for contempt.
Although the power to investigate is essentially a very broad one, it is
difficult to determine how broad the powers should be. It is dear that a valid
legislative purpose is required,15 that inquiry into the private affairs of an individual, unrelated to a legislative purpose, is limited, 16 as is the ability to extend
12.
13.
14.
273 U.S.
15.
16.

273 U.S. 135 (1926).
279 U.S. 263 (1927).
See statements of Mr. Justice Van Devanter in McGrain v. Daugherty,
135 (1926).
Quinn v. United States, 349 U.S. 155 (1955).
Ibid.
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investigations into areas involving free speech, and other substantive freedoms.
All would agree that the rights and privileges of witnesses must be accorded some
protection, and the language of the contempt statute, squarely met if a conviction is to be obtained under its use. Here the questions of pertinency,
scope of inquiry, question under inquiry, all present difficult problems, not only
of definition, but of enforcement as well. Since each resolution which authorizes
a committee to investigate a certain area of interest is different, the questions
arising under the statute will not be completely solved, but the resolution will be
accepted or rejected on its own merits, although subjected to the same tests, forced
to meet the same high standards. The same will be true of each question that is
asked a witness, and each question that is refused by a witness which may be the
basis of a contempt proceeding. All the conflicting positions, the perplexing
questions of statutory interpretation, and application were present in the decision
7
tendered by the Supreme Court in Watkins v. United States.1
THE WATKINS DEcIsIoN

One John T. Watkins, a labor union officer, complied with a subpoena, and
appeared before the House Committee on Un-American Activities,' 8 apparently
investigating Communist infiltration into labor unions. Watkins admitted his
participation in Communist activities, but denied ever being a party member. He
agreed to answer questions about himself, and about persons who were still party
members, but refused to answer questions about persons who were former
members, but who to his best knowledge were no longer connected with any
Communist group or supported any of their recommendations. The latter
questions, he contended, were not relevant to the work of the Committee, and
therefore an answer could not be compelled from him. The chairman thereupon
informed him of the purpose of the hearings, the resolution authorizing the
Committee to function, as well as the ability of the Committee to inquire about
persons, who had been members of the Communist Party. Upon further refusal
to answer, the House instituted contempt proceedings, and on the basis of his
refusal to answer, he was convicted under 2 U.S.C. §192.
The opinion of the Supreme Court, reversing and remanding, was delivered
by the Chief Justice. He traced the legislative history of the investigative powers,
noting that there had developed, since World War II, a new kind of legislative
investigation, involving what was termed a broad intrusion into the affairs of
private individuals. Pre-war cases had defined the scope of the powers in terms
of the limitations of the sources of that power, whereas in later cases the emphasis
shifted to problems of accommodating the interests of the government with the
17. See note 1, supra.
18. See brief for the United States, p. 17, Watkins v. United States, 77 Sup.
Ct. 1173 (1957).

NOTES AND COMMENTS
rights of the individual. In applying the Bill of Rights as a restraint upon congressional investigations, the Court based its decision squarely upon the Due
Process clause of the Fifth Amendment. The Chief Justice declared that a question
under inquiry had not been made dear to the witness with the same degree of
clarity and precision that is required of any element of a criminal offense, that
before a conviction under section 192 would be sustained, not only must the
question under inquiry be made dear, but also the pertinency, or relation of the
question asked to the matter under inquiry, be revealed with "undisputable
clarity." Watkins had not been informed of the question under inquiry, either in
the statements of the chairman at the time the questions were asked, nor when
the Committee convened, nor when he was ordered to answer the questions. Since
the witness could not reasonably know what conduct he was to avoid, his
conviction was not in accord with the due process requirements of the Fifth
Amendment.
Mr. Justice Clark wrote a vigorous dissent, incorporating many of the
"stock" arguments of the proponents of untrammeled use of the investigative
powers, arguing that the majority opinion was a "mischievous curbing" of congressional investigations. He took the position that the Committee was acting
entirely within its resolution, that the question under inquiry, communist infiltration of labor, was made very clear to the witness, and the questions asked were
all pertinent to this question, declaring finally that the present case did not
involve the holding in either the Kilbourne decision, nor the holding in United
States v. Rumely,19 where a statute was strictly construed and the activity of the
witness found not to be subject to investigation nor to a contempt conviction on
his refusal to testify.
THE EFFECT OF THE DECISION UPON THE CONTEMPT STATUTE

Generally, the scope of any particular congressional committee's authority
to investigate is determined by the legislative body which created the committee20
It may be as broad as the legislative purpose requires, 21 but cannot extend or
exceed the authority granted the committee by Congress. 22 Congress has been
held to possess the power to legislate and inquire in regard to Communism and
the Communist Party. 23 In establishing the House Committee on Un-American
Activities,24 the House of Representatives authorized it to make investigations of
un-American propaganda activities, the diffusion within this country of subversive
propaganda. Prior to the Watkins decision, it was found adequate if the Senate
19.

345 U.S. 41 (1953).

20. United States v. Lamont, 18 F.R.D. 27 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
21. Mareello v. United States, 196 F.2d 437 (5th Cir. 1952).
22. See note 20, supra.
23. Barsky v. United States, 167 F.2d 241 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied 334 U.S.
843 (1948).
24. 60 STAT. 828 (1946).
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or House resolution spoke with some meaning,25 and was found sufficient in
itself to show pertinency under 2 U.S.C. §192. The existence of the resolution in
the Watkins case is not challenged, that is, the ability of the House to establish
separate investigations under the authorizing resolution. But it now appears that,
were the Committee to base a conviction upon a mere reference to the enabling
resolution alone, a due process violation would result, since an enabling resolution,
being a very broadly worded document, is vague, indefinite, and loose.2 6 There
is nothing new in this position, if the distinction between the authorizing
resolution and the question under inquiry be kept clear, when a Subcommittee,
acting under a narrow grant of power, operates in a selected area, which is within
the broader area of the authorizing resolution.
It is agreed that the jurisdiction of a committee as defined by resolution
reveals the area into which the committee is empowered to inquire.2 7 Under
section 192, a person will be in contempt if he refuses to answer any question
pertinent to a question under inquiry.28 That is clear. What is not so clear is the
meaning of the phrase, "question under inquiry." Since the authorizing resolution
is too broad and subject to attack if it is used as the basis for a conviction, the
term must mean something less, something narrower than the scope of inquiry.
If we give the term a natural meaning, and construe it narrowly, which must be
done when a criminal statute is attacked,29 then the phrase takes on some meaning
and importance. Also, it is doubly important to find a clear meaning for the
phrase, since under the "itatute, pertinency cannot be'discovered unless it can be
shown that the answer is connected to a valid question under inquiry. Without
first determining the question under inquiry, there would be presented the strange
task of finding the connection for a question to a subject we do not know exists,
and then to declare that the question is pertinent because we now find that a
subject of inquiry does exist! The term, question under inquiry, must therefore
refer to a narrow, particular matter, which lies within the area of permissible
inquiry. An example would be the following: Within the resolution of the House
Committee on Un-American Activities, a sub-committee could validly be
authorized to investigate the depth, scope, and effect of communist infiltration,
either by subversion or through party infiltration, in the Ford Motor plants in the
25. See note 23, supra.
26.

77 Sup. Ct. at 1190.

27. Barry v. United States ex rel. Cunningham, 279 U.S. 597 (1929); Sinclair
v. United States, 279 U.S. 263 (1927); In re Chapman, 166 U.S. 661 (1895).
28. 2 U.S.C. §192 provides:
Every person who having been summoned ... to give testimony ...
upon any matter under inquiry before ...
any committee of either
House of Congress ...
refuses to answer any question pertinent to

the question under inquiry, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.
29. It is generally agreed that criminal statutes should be narrowly construed. See, United States v. Resnick, 299 U.S. 207, 210 (1936). Also they should
be given their plain and natural meaning. For a comprehensive discussion of the
Plain Meaning Rule, see LENHOFF, COMMENTS, CASES,
TION

557 (1949).
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Detroit area. This very narrow range must be made undisputably clear to the
witness by every source available, and is mainly done in the statements of the
chairman at the beginning of the committee hearing, and at any time that a
witness balks at answering a question. The witness should not be made to "guess"
at the question under inquiry. Again, if we use the conduct of the chairman as
an important means of informing the witness of an already-existing question, it is
evident that he cannot fulfill his function by merely parroting and paraphrasing
the authorizing resolution.3 0 He, the chairman, must be advised by the Committee
itself, acting Within its authorized reach, and must be careful that at all times, he
is sure the witness knows what the committee hearing is all about. How does the
Watkins decision shed light upon this problem of determining the "question
under inquiry?"
The majority opinion goes to some length in determining what is no;
sufficient, either standing alone, or taken as a whole, unless more dearly stated,
and then used only as guides in determining the narrow ground of present
inquiry. Yet, why were not the statements of the chairman sufficient to inform
Watkins what was under investigation by the Sub-Committee? Briefly stated,
the chairman told Watkins that the Sub-Committee was interested in acquiring
information for legislation, so as to provide that the Subversive Activities Control
Board would be ". . .empowered to find if certain labor organizations are in
fact Communist-controlled ...such labor groups would not have available the
use of the National Labor Relations Board." 3' The chairman elaborated on the
number of cities in which investigations were held in regard to the communist
threat to our labor organizations, and stated that the Sub-Committee questioning
Watkins was continuing the work of the other committee. Perhaps these statements should have been amplified, refined, and repeated for the benefit of the
witness, but it seems unrealistic to say that Watkins was completely in the dark
at the time the questions he refused to answer were asked. He seemed fully
aware of the question under inquiry when he gladly answered questions concerning
his affairs in the labor movement. The Court left much to be desired in its
treatment of the question under inquiry.
THE PROBLEM OF PERTINENCY

Since pertinency is an essential element of the crime charged, the government
must prove that the question which the witness refused to answer was in some
real way connected to the investigation,32 and this connective reasoning must be
pointed out to the witness by the Committee. The petitioner, Watkins, in effect
30. 77 Sup. Ct. at 1190.

31. 77 sup. Ct. at 1191. (The Court's footnote 49 is a full statement of the
Introductory remarks made by the chairman of the House Sub-Committee on
Un-American Activities).
32. Bowers v. United States, 202 F.2d 447 (D.C. Cir. 1953).
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said that the Sub-Committee could not show him how the question whether
certain people he knew were still communists or not, could be helpful in framing
new legislation, or in some essential way connected to the question of infiltration
into labor groups. Assuming there is present a "question under inquiry," it is
clear that the task of the committee is not over. Each question asked of the
witness must relate to that question under inquiry, and that this showing of
pertinency must be revealed by -the chairman whenever a question is challenged.
The findings of the committee are of course subject to judicial review. 33
Pertinency means pertinent to a subject properly under inquiry, and not
merely pertihent to the person under interrogation;3 4 a subject related to a
legislative purpose which Congress could constitutionally entertain.35 Prior to the
Watkins decision, reported cases in which courts have held questions asked to be
not pertinent - are meagre,3 6 involving a committee or sub-committee with relad,'vely narrbw jurisdiction. No case has actually arisen embodying the problem
whether a question asked could be found to be within the jurisdiction of the
eommittee, and yet not pertinent to the question under inquiry, when both were
in issue. 37
Since pertinency .is an element of the crime to be proved under section 192,
each question must therefore have an importance of its own in relation to the
question unider inquiry. Pertinency is not shown because the question is connected
to another question asked, or because, defining the question under inquiry as
broadly as possible, some connection will exist, between the question and the
problem before the committee. Also, pertinency should not be shown by pointing
out to the witness that the question under inquiry has been made dear. The
Watkins decision imposes a strong burden upon the committee, although not an
overwhelming burden. it must make it very dear why the committee wants the
information that the particular question asked seeks to uncover. The committee
did not make it dear to Watkins why the names of past members could in some
positive way enable the House to create new legislation. But the Court does not
tell us why the names of the past members'still active were pertinent information,
and past members not so. Present activity does of course have more weight and
bearing on immediate legislation, and the success of Watkins in not answering
may have been based upon the idea that such old information had little value to
the committee interested in future legislation.
33. United States v. Sacher, 139 F. Supp. 855 (D.C. D.C. 1956).
34. United States v. Kamin, 135 F. Supp 382 (D.C. Mass. 1955).
35. United States v. Orman, 207 F.2d 148 (3d Cir. 1953).
36. See notes 32, 34, supra.
37. Early decisions confused the question under inquiry with a question
within the authorizing resolution. See, Morford v. United States, 176 F.2d 49
(D.C. Cir. 1949). For a good discussion of this problem area, see 12 N.Y.U.
INTRAmURAL LAW REviEw 157 (March 1957).
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CONTEMPT PROCEEDING.AT THE BAR OF THE HOUSE

The early historical use of the contempt proceedings brought before the bar
of the House revealed its limitations, but the method was never totally discarded,
even 'after Section 192 was created. This traditional method of punishing for
contempt was practiced until well into the nineteen twenties,38 with section 192
the customary means of punishing recalcitrant witnesses. Had the House punished
Watkins by use of the old contempt procedure, it could be argued that the strict
statutory provisions of section 192 need not be met, and that the act of Watkins
could be treated as a violation of the dignity of the House.39 Argument would be
made that Watkins had interfered with the orderly conduct -of congressional
business, by an act comparable to an assault upon a House member,40 or attempted
bribery of a member,41 or refusal to reveal the cause of a successful rebellion.
For more recent precedent involving the use of the traditional contempt power In
a factual situation analogous to the Watkinr case, the decision of McGraiy v.
Daugherty,4 - would be brought forth to support such use of the contempt power,
insofar as conduct was compelled of a written or oral nature.
An investigation of the McGrain decision supports a contrary finding, in that
the requirements of section 192, or those as.strict and definite; would have to-be
met in order to sustain a conviction. One Harry Daugherty, who had beeh
Attorney General during the Harding Administration, was charged with certain
acts of misfeasance, and these charges were brought to the attention of the
Senate. A resolution was adopted authorizing and directing a select committee of
five senators to investigate facts concerning the alleged failure of the Attorney
General to prosecute -violators of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act, as well as his
failure to arrest Albert Fall and Harry Sinclair, persons charged with defrauding
the government in certain oil leases granted them, and the committee was' further
directed to investigate Daugherty's activities and discover if they in any way
impaired his efficiency as a representative- of the government. A subpoena was
served upon the brother of Harry Daugherty commanding him to appear before
the committee. He failed to appear, and upon a further issuances of a new
subpoena, he aagain refused to appear. The committee made a report to the
Senate reciting the facts above, and upon the. remarks of the committee, the
Senate adopted the following resolution:
Whereas the appearance and testimony of the said M. S. Daugherty
is material and essential in order that the committee may properly
execute the functions imposed upon it ...

Resolved That the President

38.
39.
40.
41.

McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135 (1926) is a good example.
Anderson v. Dunn, 6 Wheat. 204 (U.S. 1821).
See notes, 21, supra.
Ibid.

42.

See note 38, supra.
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of the Senate pro tempore issue his warrant commanding the Sergeantat-Arms to take into custody the body of said M. S. Daugherty . . .
wherever found and bring (him) . . . before the bar of the Senate
then and there to answer such questions pertinent to the matter under
inquiry.43 (Emphasis added).
The phrase "questions pertinent to the matter under inquiry" was repeated in the body of the warrant. Upon a habeas corpus proceeding, Daugherty
challenged the power of the Senate. That he was unsuccessful is not important for
the purposes of this discussion, but rather the wording of the resolution and
warrant, and the subsequent statement of the Supreme Court that, in cases
involving the answers to questions or the production of documents, the questions
of pertinency and matter (question) under inquiry must be met. Not only must a
committee be authorized to act pursuant to a valid legislative resolution, and for a
legitimate legislative purpose, but it also must narrow its area of inquiry
whenever it seeks particular information, and ask only relevant questions having
a real connection to the matter under inquiry. If such a test must be met, it does
not appear that the standards for proceeding under traditional contempt methods
are any less strict than those imposed by section 192, and that even if a distinction
could be drawn between "question under inquiry" and "matter under inquiry,"
the problem of meeting the test of pertinency would remain; perhaps the hardest
test of the two to meet. It is conceivable that the present Supreme Court would
interpret "matter under inquiry" to give it the strictness of the term "question
under inquiry." Punishment by the traditional method of a proceeding before the
bar is no less a deprivation of procedural due process, than a conviction under
section 192 without meeting the letter of the statute. Anything less than adequate
notice of what the committee is investigating, and why the questions asked are
important to that investigation, would not be in accordance with fundamental
concepts of fair play and notice.
CoNCuUSioN-DOES

THE WATKINS DECISION SEVERELY LIMIT

THE POWER OF CONGRESS TO INVESTIGATE?

Decisions of great magnitude are always subject to the vices of misstatement
and misapplication. The Watkins decision is an important statement concerning
the rights of individuals before legislative investigative bodies, and the broad
language used by the . Chief Justice is susceptible to the vices stated above
whenever one attempts to find the scope of its possible application. Its application to the power of Congress to investigate is of fundamental importance, and
any restraints the decision imposes upon that power should be gingerly applied.
Watkins v. United States44 does not cripple the investigative power of
43. 273 U.S. at 153.
44. See note 1, upra.
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Congress. In his concluding statements, the Chief Justice tempers any earlier
declarations made during the decision which might lead to the conclusion that
Congress has been stripped dean to the bone. He declares:
We are mindful of the complexities of modern government and the
ample scope that must be left to the Congress as the sole constitutional
dispository of legislative power. Equally mindful are we of the
indispensable power of congressional investigations. The conclusions we
have reached in this case will not prevent the Congress from obtaining
any information it needs for the proper fulfillment of its role.45
The important service done by the Supreme Court has been to make the
committee hearings provide the same standards of fair procedure that the Court
has compelled the government to meet whenever it enforces federal statutes. The
questions under inquiry and the pertinency of any questions asked, must be made
"undisputably clear" to the witness. This standard is a greater burden than has
ever been placed upon any congressional body, but it is greater only.in comparison
with the bare degree of information that earlier had to be given a witness when
he refused to answer any questions. 46 The Court has merely asked that a committee
do a much better job of presenting all relevant matter to the witness which would
aid him in understanding the work being done by the committee and the
importance of his answers to this work. Vague statements of the committee's role
or purpose will be condemned, and any contempt conviction reversed if based
upon the barest statements made to a witness. It is not too much to ask of
Congress that it conduct its investigations, and exercise its powers of contempt
and compulsory process with a respect for the procedural safeguards found within
the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
The term, procedural due process, has no fixed, constant definition, even
when the phrase is used to describe federally-created rights under the Fifth
Amendment. The term may at one time expand the rights and privileges of
individuals, but at another time be defined so as to prevent coverage in a
particular situation. The term gains meaning not only by the friction created
between the authority of the state and the rights of the individual, but also from
the differing views and attitudes of the individuals who comprise our society.
At periods of national tension, that group or class which desires a limitation to be
placed uppon the definition of due process will prevail, and the individual forced
to act within a narrower area of protection. It is the time, place, and circumstances,
which will define due process, and thus give the term its constantly changing
area of application.
In the Watkins decision, the Supreme Court adds a new facet which it hopes
45. 77 Sup. Ct. at 1193.
*46. The resolution standing alone was found sufficient in Barsky v. United
States, 167 F.2d (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied 334 U.S. 843 (1948).
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will aid Congress in carrying out its legitimate legislative function. The Bill of
Rights covers legislative investigations, just as it applies to prosecutions where
questions of coerced confessions, unreasonable searches and seizures, and selfincrimination are involved. 47 Standards of fair practices and procedure as they
apply to legislative investigative bodies call for adequate notice to be given a
witness of the matter under inquiry, and a careful explanation of the connection
between all questions asked and the question under investigation. Thus, required
conduct will be clearly separated from conduct which is outside the permissible
reach of the committee, and a witness will not be heard to say that he did not
receive warning. Congress must mend its ways4" in order to bring its standard of
W 49
conduct within that scheme of well-ordered liberty
which is the Due Process
Clause. The approach of the Supreme Court is not new, nor radical. It is in
keeping with its traditional role whenever the rights of the State conflict with
the rights and privileges of its citizens, and a. delicate task of accommodation
must be performed. The Supreme Court has made this accommodation in the
Watkins decision at the expense of the State, and in favor of the citizens, but has
at the same time preserved for the State, acting through its legislature, its proper
legitimate function when performed with the procedures required by due process
considerations.
Thomas T. Basil
47. McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943) (delay in arraignment);
Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886) (unreasonable search and seizure);
Emspak v. United States, 349 U.S. 190 (1955) (self-incrimination).
48. Peters, The Supreme Court and the Spirit of 1957, 7 BUFFALo L. REv.
44 (1957).
49. Palko v. Conn., 302 U.S. 319 (1937).

